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This paper analyzes the economic effects of content-based import tariffs China imposed on 
imported auto parts. While China’s policy penalized any firm that assembled cars with less 
than 60 percent Chinese content, the policy was most likely to affect foreign affiliated firms 
who were more likely to exceed the content ceiling. To assess whether foreign-affiliated firms 
differentially changed their input sourcing this paper uses Chinese product trade data for 1997 
to  2009 which report trade transactions by firm ownership type. Compared with import 
transactions for other firms, the data show that foreign-affiliated firms appear to have 
mitigated the effects of the policy by reducing import transaction prices, and by reducing their 
import quantities on the extensive margin. While China’s content-based auto import trade 
policy was repealed in 2009 after China lost its dispute case at the WTO, the extraordinary 
growth in China’s global export of auto parts since 2005 suggests that China’s short term 
trade policy may have contributed to enduring effects in global supply chains. 
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  China’s policies towards automotive sector imports received particular attention during 
China’s WTO accession talks.  For example, while the U.S. bilateral agreement with China 
included general tariff guidelines
2, the U.S. bilateral agreement with China was more explicit in 
its framework for four industries including automobiles.  Here, the bilateral agreement noted the 
expectation that by 2006 China’s import tariff on assembled cars was to be reduced from its pre-
WTO level of 80% or 100% to 25%, while the diverse rates of tariff on auto parts were to be 
reduced such that the average tariff on auto parts declined to 10%. 
 
  The special attention paid to China’s automotive sector was not entirely surprising, as the 
Chinese automotive market offers a new set of challenges and opportunities.  In general, growth 
forecasts for the next few decades predict that economic growth will be centered in emerging 
economies.  In this context, multinational firms that hope to expand their sales will need to learn 
how to serve customers in emerging markets such as China.  Moreover, vehicle production in 
China has grown rapidly since it joined the WTO in 2001, in contrast with the plateauing of 
vehicle production in most other regions of the world.   
 
  Following China’s WTO entry in 2001, China initiated the phase-in of auto sector tariff 
cuts according to the scheduled guidelines.  However, in 2004 China announced new rules which 
prevented many assembly firms from utilizing the newly lowered tariffs on imported auto parts.  
Beginning in 2005, China’s new regulations required all auto makers who used imported parts to 
register with China’s Customs Administration.  It also required automobile assemblers to provide 
a list of the imported and domestic parts used in each vehicle they produced, including 
information on the value and supplier for each part.  If the assembler’s use of imported parts 
caused the Chinese content of the assembled automobile to fall below 60 percent, the tariff 
applied to imported parts was to be that for assembled automobiles, rather than the tariff applied 
to the specific auto part.  Such a change in the tariff designation represented a cost increase for 
impacted firms, since the Chinese tariff on assembled autos was fifteen percentage points higher 
than the average tariff levied on car parts.
3  The new regulations also specified that knock-down 
                                                 
2 China agreed to reduce average tariffs to 9.4%, while the tariffs on priority products were to fall to 7.1%.  
3 See “United States Requests WTO Panel in Challenge of China’s  Treatment of U.S. Auto Parts” , posted 
09/15/2006 at,[ http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2006/September/United_States_ 
Requests_WTO_Panel_in_Challenge_of_Chinas_Treatment_of_US_Auto_Parts.html]. 2 
 
car kits for assembly in China were to face the higher tariff rate, rather than the lower tariff rates 
that applied to individual parts. 
 
  Evidence from Chinese data on tariff payments indicates that tariff-reclassification under 
China’s content-based tariff policy impacted some but not all assemblers’ auto parts imports.  
For example, in 2005 the tariff rate applied to imported engines was 9%, while the tariff applied 
to assembled automobiles was 25%.  Thus, the fact that the average tariff paid on imported 
engines [HS 840820] in 2005 was 17% indicates that a non-trivial share of auto producers failed 
to meet the content requirement and thus paid the 25% tariff on their engine imports.  In 
addition, any assembler who failed to meet the content requirement, paid the tariff penalty 
surcharge, not just for engines, but on all of their parts imports, which by definition were more 
than 40 percent of the inputs in the completed product. 
 
  In the case of complex international production chains, as are seen in the auto sector, the 
reliance on imported parts is not surprising since firms often source parts that are specifically 
tailored for use in their models.  As a result, if a firm sourced a part from outside of China at the 
time of the new policy announcement, there was the presumption that the firm would prefer to 
continue to import the part for its Chinese-based production, at least in the short-run. Thus, while 
the new tariff rule applied to all firms producing cars in China regardless of ownership, press 
accounts at the time suggested that the policy had a disproportionate effect on foreign-affiliated 
producers who were more likely to import a large percentage of their parts, and therefore to face 
the tariff-increasing reclassification of their imported parts.   
 
  In 2006 parties from the U.S., E.U. and Canada launched dispute cases against China 
with the Dispute Settlement Board of the WTO, because China’s content-based tariff regulations 
were viewed as breaching China’s WTO accession agreements, as well as common elements of 
country WTO obligations.  In February 2008, the dispute settlement panel issued a preliminary 
ruling that the Chinese measures violated WTO rules, as they "accord imported auto parts less 
favorable treatment than like domestic auto parts" or "subject imported auto parts to an internal 
charge in excess of that applied to like domestic auto parts."  Five months later, China lost its 
first WTO case as the final judgment of the WTO dispute settlement panel came to the same 
conclusion.  In September 2008, China immediately announced its plans to appeal the WTO 3 
 
decision.  However, just following the circulation of the WTO report, the Dispute Settlement 
Body held a meeting on January 12, 2009.  In this forum,  
 
“Canada, the EC and the US expressed their satisfaction with the findings ….. and 
the overall conclusion that the specific Chinese measures at issue violated GATT 
article III by imposing an internal charge and an administrative burden on 
imported auto parts that were not borne by domestic parts.  They noted that the 
measures compelled auto producers to purchase auto parts from domestic 
producers and also to transfer technology to China to enable it to become a major 
player in the automobiles sector.”
4 
 
Following the meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, China agreed in February 2009 to bring 
its policies in line with the points raised by the dispute settlement board.  While China agreed to 
comply with the WTO ruling, it argued that it needed time to implement the tariff modifications.   
On September 1, 2009 China returned to its accession-agreed tariffs, absent any conditionality 
based on content.  This date coincided precisely with the WTO dispute framework that allowed 
the claimants to impose penalties on China if China maintained its content-based tariffs beyond 
that date. 
 
  To study how trade policy helped shape developments in a growing auto industry this 
paper starts by presenting a background on changes in the Chinese automotive sector. Next, I 
provide a model of parts procurement that highlights the changes in sourcing incentives rendered 
by China’s changes in content policy.  The model suggests that cost-minimizing foreign-
affiliated firms had an incentive to avoid or reduce tariff surcharges by reducing their reliance on 
imported inputs as long as the fixed costs associated sourcing changes didn’t exceed the overall  
tariff benefits generated by the sourcing changes.  Firm sourcing changes favored by the content-
based tariff policy implied that affected firms would reduce import quantities, and/or changing 
import prices through manipulation or sourcing changes. These model implications are tested on 
Chinese import trade transaction data for 1997-2009.  In general, regressions based on import 
prices and import quantities at the extensive margin support the predictions of the model. The 
                                                 
4 The WTO web site http://www.sto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/dsb_12jan09_e.htm, provides a summary of the 
involved party’s opinions about the findings in the WTO cases DS339, DS340 and DS342. 4 
 
paper concludes with interpretation of the results, and discussion of factors influencing the 




2.0  Policy Environment and  Background on the Chinese Automobile Market 
 
  Developments in the Chinese automotive industry are of great importance, since they are 
likely to affect the futures of automakers worldwide.  This is because the predominant sources of 
growth in the auto industry for the next few decades are predicted to lie in emerging markets, 
such as China and India, rather than traditional developed country markets.
5  However, foreign 
multinational firms are worried about their ability to benefit from this growth, due to speculation 
that “In five years, China wants 60% of car parts in new Chinese vehicles to be locally made.  
This is alarming news for Germany, the leading European exporter to China thanks to car parts, 
machine tools and other widgets.”
6  Thus, to provide a better understanding of the Chinese 
market, I begin by providing some information on the Chinese automotive market. 
 
 
2.1  Chinese auto production and auto parts sector 
 
Chinese national statistics reveal the importance of the automobile of industry in China.  
The China Statistical Yearbook reported that the sector “Manufacture of Transport Equipment”, 
which encompasses the automobile industry, had 15,611 enterprises in 2009 and employed 4.5 
million workers.  The statistics also demonstrate that foreign firms were large employers in this 
sector.  Of all urban workers engaged in the “manufacture of transport equipment”, 67 percent 
were employed by firms in other types of ownership, as distinct from the 27.7 percent employed 
by SOEs, and 5.3 percent employed by Urban Collective-owned units.
7  As in other countries, 
the Chinese automobile industry is heavily concentrated geographically.   Of China’s 31 
provinces, 22 had some auto production by 2009, a 50% rise above the 15 provinces with  
                                                 
5 Weinert, Ogden, Sperling, and Burke (2008). 
6 The Economist, April 18th 2009, p59. 
7  Calculations based on Table 4.6 “Number of Employed Persons in Urban Units at Year-end by Status of 
Registration and Sector in Detail (2007)” in the China Statistical Yearbook. 5 
 
automobile output in 2002.  The top four provinces in terms of car production were Shanghai, 




  The growth in automobile production is especially dramatic, as it has been more rapid 
than the growth of per capita incomes.  For example, automobile production output rose more 
than eight-fold between 2000 and 2007, while household income just about doubled.
9  The 
expansion Chinese consumer demand was met through growth at the extensive and intensive 
margins.  Between 2002 and 2009 there was a proliferation of large auto producers in China.  For 
example, in 2002, there were only two car production operations that exceed production volumes 
of 150,000 cars: the VW joint ventures with FAW and SAIC.  Production output in 2002 already 
represented a large increase in output, as in 2001, only one venture exceeded 100,000 units. By 
2009, sixteen different production ventures exceed 150,000 units, and they were joined by a 
large group of entrants.  Thus, growth in Chinese production was driven both by expansions in 
production scale, and by entry of many new foreign and local producers. 
 
  Since many factors influenced the growth of China’s car parts imports, it is difficult to 
isolate the effects of trade policy on parts imports decisions.  This is especially true, due to the 
extraordinary rate of growth in Chinese trade generally, and the accompanying rise in automobile 
trade and production.  For example, between 1999 and 2009, Chinese import of automobile parts 
rose by more than a factor of five.  However, the growth in Chinese passenger car production 
was even more dramatic, as the number of autos produced in China rose more than 17-fold over 
the same interval.  While the less rapid growth of automobile parts imports is consistent with 
trade policy effects, it could also be fostered by the growing importance of China-based 
producers who had a natural tendency to source a larger share of parts from Chinese parts 




                                                 
8 Shares calculated based on motor vehicle production data in Table 14-23 in the 2010 China Statistical Yearbook.  
The next largest producers, Beijing and Tianjin, were responsible for 7.2 and 7.1 percent of national production. 
9 Table 2-24 of the China Statistical Yearbook reports that household income in current prices was 3,632 Yuan in 
2000 and 7,081 Yuan in 2007.  For Urban households, the rise was from 6,850 Yuan in 2000 to 11,855 in 2007. 6 
 
2.2 Additional Chinese policies influencing automobile production and parts imports 
 
  In considering the effects of China’s content-based tariff policy, it is important to 
acknowledge that China had many other policies in effect that also had the potential to influence 
auto assemblers’ global supply chains. In part, China’s economic rise has been shaped and 
directed by government actions that have targeted sectors for favor, providing resources and an 
operating environment that were crafted to achieve desired goals.  Among those sectors receiving 
such attention is the automotive sector.  In the early 1990’s government policy encouraged 
collaborative ventures between Chinese firms and international partners as a means of advancing 
Chinese auto sector capability.  
 
  More recently, Chinese policy has encouraged movements into the more advanced 
segments of the industry - research and product design in addition to the manufacture of 
automobiles - with the aspiration of producing world class Chinese automobiles under the 
auspices of Chinese companies and brand names.  To this end, the State Development and 
Reform Commission and Ministry of Commerce released a revised investment catalogue that 




                                                 
10 http://www.hg.org/articles/article_495.html. 7 
 
3.0 Modeling the effects of China’s Tariff Policy 
 
When China reserved lower auto parts tariffs for firms that met minimum Chinese 
content standards, auto assemblers that failed to meet the content policy had the option of 
pursuing one of  three different strategies.  First, auto assembly firms could avoid or reduce their 
tariff surcharge penalties, by reducing their imports of auto parts from outside of China.  
Similarly, firms could avoid or reduce the tariff surcharges, by changing the prices of their 
imported parts imports through price manipulation, or the use of cheaper sources of import.  
Finally, firms could pay the tariff surcharge penalties as the cost of maintaining their established 
sourcing structure. 
 
While China’s content-based automotive tariff policy was targeted at a particular 
industrial sector, content policies are a common component of many free trade area agreements.  
This is  because free trade areas often include provisions regarding content requirements and 
rules of origin that determine which products  qualify for tariff preferences within the free trade 
area.  For this reason, Lopez-de-Silenas, Markusen and Rutherford’s (1996) model, which 
clarifies how the NAFTA affected the production and sourcing choices of auto assembly firms 
operating in the U.S., Canada or Mexico, can be adapted to describe the incentives generated by 
China’s automotive tariff policies. 
 
  Lopez-de-Silenas, Markusen and Rutherford’s (1996) framework is underpinned by the 
idea that auto production involves the assembly of a set of parts and components which are 
originally sourced from countries indexed by k.  The value of parts  VZkc has two subscripts: the 
first denotes the country (k) origin of the part, while the second represents the location (c) where 
the part is assembled into an automobile.  In analyzing NAFTA production, c denoted whether 
assembly occurred in the U.S., Mexico, Canada or the rest of the world.  In contrast, China’s 
tariff policy applies specifically to production in China, and for this reason, the subscript c in the 
modified model denotes the use of the part for auto assembly in China.  Depending on the part’s 
origin, parts face a tariff  TZkc assessed on the product’s value.  Here too, the tariff has the same 
set of subscripts, as the size and presence of the tariff depends on the part’s origin.   
 8 
 
  China’s trade policies, which were implemented in 2005, required automakers to produce 
cars which met the content requirement γc.  Auto assembly firms were required to produce cars 
that contained at least 60% Chinese-origin parts and components if they wanted to qualify for the  
lower tariff on imported parts.  In applying the tariff policy, content rules were evaluated firm by 
firm.  However, to reduce notational clutter, the firm problem is presented without firm or year 
subscripts.  China’s content requirement is represented by equation (1) 
 






















However, since no tariffs applied to auto parts or components sourced within China, the 
expression reduces to: 
 


















Auto assemblers who failed to meet the 60 percent Chinese content requirement, faced a higher 
tariff rate on their import of auto parts and components:  rather than paying the scheduled tariff 
for the auto part, which averaged 10 percent, they were instead assessed the 25 percent tariff that 
applied to imported automobiles.   
 
  The first strategy firms could take was to comply with the content-based tariff policy.  
Compliance with the new content requirements implied that vehicle by vehicle, automakers 
would source inputs in a fashion that minimized production costs while meeting but not 
exceeding the content requirement, γc.  The benefit of this strategy is that it qualified the firm to 
import parts at the lower tariff rate.   
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In this firm problem the Lagrange multiplier on the sourcing requirement given by (2) reflects 
the shadow cost for meeting the content requirement.  Due to differences in technology, global 
headquarters location and firm factors, the Lagrange multiplier μ
j
kc for assembling automobiles 
in China from inputs sourced from the array of countries k will differ by firm ownership type j.  
In the analysis, firm ownership types include Sino-foreign jointt ventures, state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and private domestic firms. 
 
  The total value of  imported parts (VZ) sourced from each country k, represents a 
composite of multiple parts z that are purchased from source country producers.  Thus, if the 
transaction price for an imported part z that is sourced from origin country k and used in China is 
pzkc the resulting shadow prices pzkc  for parts are as follows: 
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The decomposition in equation (3) illustrates the differential cost of sourcing parts within China 
(k=c) versus sourcing parts by import from another country, or the case where k ≠ c.  Since the 
purchase of an additional part from China helps to loosen the firm’s binding cost of complying 
with China’s tariff policy, the cost of purchasing parts from a Chinese supplier is below the price 
of the part itself, pzc.  As Lopez-de-Silenes, Markusen and Rutherford (1996) point out, this can 
be viewed equivalently as a subsidy rate of (1- (1-γc)µ
j
kc) on the purchase of a content-qualifying 
input. In contrast, the import of additional parts for assembly imposes additional costs as the firm 
will have to reconfigure other sourcing decisions if it is comply with the sourcing requirement, 
while accommodating the new import.  In this case, the shadow cost of imported parts exceeds 
the net of tariff import price by (1+γcµ
j
kc), which works like a tax.  The actual rate of tax or 
subsidy is influenced by the content requirement, and the firm’s difficulty in meeting the 
requirement, as given by the lagrange multiplier.  If the content requirement is not binding for 




  While there are no published reports that list the set of assemblers by model and year who 
met or failed to meet China’s content requirement, we expect that the content requirement 
created a greater burden for Chinese auto assembly operations that were run by firms that 
included a foreign partner.  This is due to the fact that auto assemblers generally use a greater 
share of parts sourced from their headquarters country.
11  In addition, the political economy of 
trade policy creation suggests that when policy-makers design policies, they will choose 
regulations that home firms can meet.  At a minimum, these points suggest that the shadow cost 
of importing parts was lower for non-foreign assembly firms producing cars in China, and that if 
the policy was designed such that the content requirement was not binding for Chinese firms, 
Chinese firms would not have faced the implicit subsidy or tax, implied by the prices given by 
(3).  In either case, the model implies that after China’s imposition of the content policy, foreign-
affiliated assembly firms in China faced a greater incentive to curtail their purchases of imported 
automotive parts. 
 
  The benefit of meeting the content requirement was the avoidance of the per-vehicle 
tariff penalty,  
 
c k p Penalty z a z zk ≠ ∀ − = ) ( * τ τ , 
where τa was the tariff on assembled automobiles and τz was the rate of tariff for part z.  From a 
firm perspective, it was sensible to comply with China’s new content regulations if the sum total 
of penalties avoided (penalty per vehicle*vehicles affected by policy) did not exceed the fixed 
costs of changing the firm’s operations to attain compliance with the policy. 
  
  A second option firms could pursue was to reduce or eliminate their tariff penalty by 
understating the costs of imported parts included in their vehicles.  In cases where the firm 
reduced its stated parts price, but still failed to meet the content-requirement, the per-vehicle 
tariff benefit of understatement would be: 
 
c k p p duction Penalty z a zk z zk ≠ ∀ − − = ) ( * ) ' ( Re τ τ , 
                                                 
11 See Swenson (1997) and Blonigen (2001)  provide evidence that the U.S. content of U.S.-based auto assembly 
was higher for U.S.-owned firms than it was for Japanese firms.  In the case of multinational producers, this 
incentive would also influence the propensity of firms to purchase from their current global affiliates. 11 
 
 
Where p’zk is the price declared for the imported part.  As long as the declared price p’ was lower 
than the actual price p, the tariff penalty reduction is proportional to the degree of under-
reporting.  Under the second strategy, the firm would weigh the full benefit [(Penalty-reduction 
per vehicle)*Vehicles Sold] against the probability of being caught and the penalties it might 
face if policy-makers learned of the price manipulation.  Under this strategy, the firm problem is 
analogous to that of transfer price manipulation.
 12 
 
The final option for firms facing the tariff penalties was to retain their original sourcing pattern, 
and simply pay the tariff surcharge penalty for failing to meet the 60% Chinese content 
requirement.  This choice was optimal when the costs of changing the sourcing structure was 
higher than the tariffs avoided and/or the tariff benefits generated by misstating import prices 
failed to compensate for the risks and penalties the firm would pay if its price manipulation was 
uncovered. 
 
4.0 Estimation  
4.1  Data 
  To evaluate the effects of China’s content-based tariff policy on the volume, price and 
quantity of imported of auto parts, detailed Chinese import transactions data for the years 1997 to 
2009 are studied.
13   Chinese trade data are especially well suited to the analysis of firm issues, 
since the 8-digit product-level trade transactions are reported at a fine level of detail that 
provides information on the firm’s type of ownership (SOE, Foreign, Joint Venture, Private or 
Collective), as well as the location of the firm.  The first step in the assembly of the data was to 
identify all international HS6 product codes that encompass automotive parts.
14  Based on these 
HS6 classifications, all Chinese trade transactions at the HS8 level were collected.   
 
  While car parts were imported under a number of trade regimes, China’s content-based 
tariff policy did not have any effect on auto parts imported for use in processing trade.  This is 
                                                 
12 Swenson (2001), Fisman and Wei (2004) , Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006), and Fisman, Moutarski and Wei 
(2007) present evidence that reported trade prices respond to tax and or tariff incentives. 
13 The trade data, which were reported in the Customs General Administration of the People’s Republic of China for 
1997-2009  record all export transactions at the HS 8 level of disaggregation.  These data were used under license to 
the Center for International Data (CID) at the University of California, Davis. 
14 The HS6 codes and product titles used in this project are listed in the data appendix. 12 
 
because processing trade, which requires re-export from China, is free of tariff.  In addition, 
while China has rapidly expanded its export of automotive parts, China’s export shipment of 
assembled automobiles is still very small.  For these reasons, this project analyzes data on 
China’s ordinary trade in auto parts, which was subject to the changes in tariff policy.  The 
complete data set forms an unbalanced panel of ordinary auto parts imports for 1997 to 2009, 
which are disaggregated to the HS8 product, importing province, country source and firm type  
level.  
 
  The time evolution of these Chinese car part import transactions is presented in Table 1.  
Two aspects of the data are immediately apparent.  First, automotive imports have grown 
exceptionally in both value and in diversity of unique transactions.  Between 1997 and 2009, 
import values rose tenfold.  Second, while China’s new trade policy put foreign-affiliated auto 
firms at a disadvantage, the combined share of foreign and Sino-foreign joint venture (JV) 
imported car parts value did not decline following the new policy.  In general, all firms continued 
to increase their imports of inputs, coincident with the growth of the Chinese auto industry.   
 
  To provide further information about the evolution of automotive imports, Table 2 
presents the year by year counts of unique transactions handled by each of the firm types.  
Following the implementation of China’s tariff policies, one would predict that foreign-affiliated 
assembly firms would have reduced their reliance on imported automotive parts. In this project, 
this would imply that import transactions by foreign joint venture firms in China should have 
declined relative to automotive assembly imports by other firms.  Even if their import values did 
not immediately decrease, we expect that foreign-affiliated firms would  reduce their 
introduction of new import suppliers into their global production chain supplying assembly in 
China.  In line with differential effects under the tariff policy changes, the data in Table 2 show 
that the relative number of transactions by foreign joint venture firms slowed  relative to import 
transactions by foreign invested firms.    
 
4.2 Evidence from Import Dutiable Value 
 
  The analysis begins with dutiable import value as the dependent variable, as it is the 
closest analogue to the variable VZkc in the import demand model.  For the first regressions, the 13 
 
dependent variable is the log of dutiable import value Ln(DValue)igt of HS8 industry part [i] in 
year [t], aggregated by firm ownership type [g]
15. I use the following regression framework: 
 
(4) Ln(DValue)igt  = α +  θ1*[Foreign JV*New Policy]igt  + ΣGg + ΣGTrendg + Σμt +  ζigt 
 
Foreign JV is an indicator variable that is one for trade transactions conducted by Sino-foreign 
joint ventures, while New Policy is an indicator variable that is set to one in the years when 
China imposed the content-based tariff policy. To search for evidence that Chinese firms with 
foreign JV ownership changed their behavior in light of China’s new tariff policy, the coefficient 
of interest is θ1: the model predicts that θ1 will be negative if the content-based tariff policy 
caused foreign-affiliated firms to reduce their reliance on imported inputs.   
 
  In addition to the policy variable the regression includes a number of controls.  First, 
since foreign affiliated firms may have a different propensity to rely on imported parts, the 
regression includes controls for firm ownership group type, Gg   and ownership group time trends 
GTrendg.  The regressions also include time indicator variables μt  to capture year to year 
changes in the macroeconomic environment, local infrastructure, or other factors that changed 
the relative attractiveness for all producers in sourcing parts from outside of China. Time 
variables are also important for capturing changes over time in Chinese parts quality.   All 
regressions are estimated using fixed effects panel regressions.   
 
  In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 the fixed panel effect of the error term is HS8 Product.  
While the first column includes all years, 1997-2009, the second column is restricted to 2001-
2009, in case China’s membership in the WTO resulted in new sourcing patterns by firm type 
and HS8 product.  However, regardless of the time period chosen, the first two regressions yield 
positive but insignificant coefficients that fail to support the hypothesis of reduced import 
sourcing by foreign-affiliated firms after the implementation of the content-based tariff policy.    
 
  To account for the possibility of shifts in sourcing patterns over time, the dependent 
variable is further disaggregated to the HS8-Firm group-Source Country [s] level, in the next two 
columns of Table 3. 
                                                 
15 The four firm groups are 1) SOE 2) Joint Venture, 3) Foreign Firm, and 4) Private Domestic. 14 
 
 
(5) Ln(DValue)igst  = α + θ1*[Foreign JV*New Policy]igst + ΣGg + ΣGTrendg + Σμt + ζigst 
 
As before, the regression is estimated using fixed effect panel techniques, which now include 
HS8-Source Country fixed effects in the error term.  In this setting, the results are mixed.  While 
the regression based on the full sample suggests that foreign JV-affiliated firms did not change 
the dutiable value of their imports relative to other firms in China, the sample based on years 
when China was a member of the WTO suggest foreign-JV affiliated firms reduced their car 
parts imports by 20 percent relative to other firms during the policy years.   
 
  For a final perspective on the dutiable value responses of firms, the regression was 




(6) Ln(DValue)ift  = α + θ1*[Foreign JV *New Policy]ift +  ΣGTrendfg + Σμt + ζift 
 
In this regression, the error term ζift is modeled as having a HS8 product-firm  component, and an 
iid component.  As with the previous regression, the coefficient on the Foreign JV policy term is 
negative, but the estimates are not statistically significant.  Thus, the dutiable value regression 
results in Table 3 are mixed, with some, but not all of the coefficients coinciding with the main 
model prediction.  While there is some evidence in the dutiable values that Foreign JV firms 
reduced their dutiable value of parts imports when China moved to its content-based tariff 
policy, the results are weak. 
 
4.2 Evidence from Import Prices 
 
  Changes in dutiable import values reflect the combined effects of changes in import 
quantities and import prices.  Due to the nature of automobile production, firms may find it 
difficult to changes parts import quantities quickly if local choices are less plentiful, or if firms 
take time making adjustments to meet the new policy.  Thus, if adjustment costs are high, firms 
may instead choose to mitigate the effects of the content policy by modifying prices.  
                                                 
16 As in Feenstra and Hanson (2005), a firm-analogue is identified in the trade data through the unique combination 
of firm type (SOE, FIE, JV, Domestic) and location identifiers.  15 
 
Unfortunately, the trade data do not report whether the transactions involved arm’s length 
transactions or transactions between related parties in a multinational firm’s network, as a price 
manipulation strategy is only relevant for trade between related parties.  In particular, in the case 
of related party import of auto parts, it is possible that firms maintained the same flow of 
imported parts, while declaring lower prices per unit.   In this case, even if the firm’s sourcing 
still failed to to meet the strict 60% content requirement, price manipulation would reduce the 
parts value on which it paid the higher duty.  However, even in the case of transactions between 
unrelated parties it is also possible that prices declined due to foreign invested assembly firms in 
China negotiating lower mark-ups from their unaffiliated suppliers outside of China following 
the adverse tariff shock of the content policy.  To test whether firms impacted by the content-
based tariffs had differential movements in import prices, the analysis now moves to price as the 
dependent variable, where price [p] is measured by import unit values at the HS8 product, firm 
ownership type level. 
 
 (7) Ln(p)igt = α +  θ1*[Foreign JV*New Policy]igt  + ΣGg + Σμt +  ζigt 
 
The results of estimating equation (7) are displayed in Table 4.  As the results indicate, the unit 
values of parts imports by foreign-affiliated JV firms declined when China’s parts import policy 
was put into effect.  While the point estimates differ slightly, the basic result is the same whether 
the designation of policy effects is defined as post-2004, or post-2005.  Thus, it appears that 
firms responded to the policy, at least in part, through changes in declared import prices.    
 
  To further assesses the effects of the policy on declared prices, the unit value data are 
disaggregated to form a panel of observations at the HS8, Firm ownership type, Country-source 
level.  The control variables include HS6 product terms.  Further the regression is estimated with 
fixed effects panel regressions that include source-country-year fixed effects in the error term of 
(Table 5A) and source-country-HS4 fixed effects in the error term of (Table 5B). 
 
(8-1) Ln(p)igst = α +  θ1*[Foreign JV*New Policy]igst  + ΣGg + ΣH6i +  ζigt 
(8-2) Ln(p)igst = α +  θ1*[Foreign JV*New Policy]igst  + ΣGg + ΣH6i + Σμt +  δigt 
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While the regressions in Tables 5A and 5B report results from a number of specifications that 
allow for changes in the timing of the policy effect, and for the possibility that foreign importers 
also experienced changes in import prices, all the results indicate that foreign-JV import prices 
declined by 12 to 14 percent relative to other importing firms, while no measureable price 
decline was noted for foreign firms in China. 
 
  For a final perspective on prices, the price regression is run with prices for a panel of 
price data disaggregated to the  HS8- firm level using source country-year fixed effects as the 
fixed effect in the panel error term, following: 
 
(9) Ln(p)ifst = α +  θ1*[Foreign JV*New Policy]ifst  + ΣGfg + ΣH6i +  ζifst 
 
As was true for price data reported at the product-country source level, the results displayed in 
Table 6 indicate that the prices of parts imported by joint-venture foreign affiliated firms 
declined by 16 to 22 percent following China’s content-based tariff policy.  In these data, there is 
also evidence of a price reduction during the policy years for foreign firms importing car parts, 
though the magnitude of the reduction was smaller, and the price changes for the two groups are 
statistically distinct.   Overall, the data on Chinese auto import prices reveal a negative 
relationship between auto parts imports prices and the implementation of China’s policy, that is 
robust to changes in data aggregation or regression controls. 
 
4.3 Evidence from Import Quantities 
 
  Firms had two potential avenues for changing firm import quantities.  At the intensive 
margin, affected firms could reduce their import quantities of products already imported.  If the 
firm maintained its output levels, this strategy meant the firm would replace some of the 
imported parts with Chinese-produced substitutes.  However, firms could also react to the policy 
at the extensive margin, discontinuing the import of some parts, or not starting to import other 
parts, that were otherwise imported by Chinese producers who did not face a binding content 
constraint.  The data from Chinese imports suggest that action at the extensive margin was 
consistent with changes in the tariff environment, while there is no evidence for adjustments at 




  To check import quantity responses at the intensive margin, one option is to run product 
by product regressions which relate imports of HS8 products disaggregated to the firm type-year 
level, to see whether foreign-JV firms reduced their import quantities relative to other firms after 
the policies were implemented.  However, when this experiment is tried with the Chinese trade 
data, the policy coefficients take on both positive and negative values, which are statistically 
insignificant in the majority of cases.   
 
  Alternatively, it is possible to run panel regressions which replace the price variables 
used as the dependent variables in specifications (7) – (9) with similarly disaggregated quantity 
variables.  However, since dutiable value is price multiplied by quantity, quantity regressions are 
somewhat redundant.  Further, while the policy variable takes on the predicted negative 
coefficient in some regressions, the estimated coefficient for the policy years is often positive for 
both joint venture and foreign imports of car parts.  This is puzzling since it suggests that 
foreign-affiliated firms in China accelerated the pace of their parts imports during the period 
when Chinese policy imposed tariff penalties for excess reliance on imported inputs. One 
plausible possible explanation for these quantity changes is changes in consumer market demand 
for joint-venture produced automobiles, as a rise in the relative demand for joint venture 
produced automobiles provides a plausible reason why  demand for parts used in joint-venture 
cars would have risen during the policy years relative to those used in non-joint venture Chinese 
operations. However, in the absence of data on sourcing at the firm and model level, it is difficult 
to evaluate whether differential demand growth by firm ownership type can explain the increased 
volume of imports by foreign-affiliated firms during the policy period. 
 
  Another possibility is that foreign-affiliated firms did not adjust their parts import 
quantities because they were unable to switch suppliers, at least in the short-run.  If so, foreign-
affiliated joint ventures would have imported parts commensurate with the production demands 
in their rapidly growing Chinese assembly operations.  The decision to maintain parts imports 
after 2004 may have been further compounded by the concern in the early 2000’s that Chinese 
parts were of much lower quality than those attained by import, and by the fact that suppliers 




  The customs trade data do not provide information that would link firm identifiers in a 
way that tracks supply chain decisions by firms.  However, auxiliary information on sourcing 
decisions can be used to study exit and entry decisions during the policy period.    For this task, I 
take the import transactions data disaggregated to the HS8 product, firm ownership type and 
province level and create zero/one indicator variables that indicate whether the particular 
product-ownershiptype-province combination had active imports in the year or not.  To study 
exit,  I begin with the full universe of active import combinations in 2004.  I then run a probit 
regression to test whether the active transactions of foreign-affiliated firms were more likely to 
end than were transactions conducted by other firms. 
 
(10) Probit (Exit)igp  = α + β*ln(TransactionDV_2004) igp + ΣGg + ΣH6i + ΣP + ΣH6i + κigp 
 
Controls include HS6 fixed effects (ΣH6i) province fixed effects (ΣP) and the transaction 
dutiable value of the transaction in 2004.  Separate firm-ownership group coefficients are also 
estimated.  The model predictions is that the exit probability of foreign-affiliated firms should 
have exceed the exit probabilities of other firms by ownership type.  Table 7 presents these 
results by analyzing the probability that 2004 import transactions ceased by either 2005 or 2006.  
Consistent with policy-induced changes, the data show that even after controlling for transaction 
size, foreign-JV firms were more likely to drop parts imports relationships than were foreign 
firms or private firms.  Table 8 examines an analogous question by testing for the prevalence of 
firm types among new HS8-firm type-province transactions, initiated at the time of the content 
policy implementation.  In this exercise, we study the complete panel of entry, as defined by the 
emergence of transactions that were not active in 2004.  Since the data show that new 
transactions were less common for foreign-JV firms than they were for private or foreign firms, 
the data suggest that foreign-JV firms may have turned to local Chinese suppliers to support their 
growth in auto output, even in cases where outside sourcing was preferred by firms who made 





5.0  Discussion 
  Since trade data do not provide evidence of China’s tariff policy curtailing the intensive 
margin quantities of auto parts imports by foreign producers, it might be tempting to conclude 
that the policy only had a limited influence on multinational production structures.  Indeed, press 
accounts suggested that many parts suppliers felt compelled changes their supply choices due to 
tariff-content policy.
17  However, the effects of these policies may be stronger in the long run if 
the relocation of auto assemblers or their suppliers, or the switch to domestic Chinese suppliers 
took time.  When Chung, Mitchell and Yeung (2003) studied parts sourcing by Japanese firms 
that located in the U.S. during the 1980’s, they discover that once a Japanese firm sought inputs 
from a U.S. supplier, they would continue to purchase from the U.S. supplier for the entire model 
run of about four years.  This finding suggests that firms may wait to the end of a current model 
run before making a supplier switch, but once the supplier switch is made, the switch is 
enduring.   
Changes in China’s parts Production Capability- Evidence from Exports 
  In the absence of direct evidence on the productivity of Chinese auto parts producers, or 
on the relative quality of Chinese auto parts, we can draw inferences about longer-run 
developments in the Chinese automotive sector capability by turning to Chinese data on 
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Note: Author’s construction from Chinese Customs Data Base. 
                                                 
17 See the June 22, 2005 article at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GF22Ad02.html.  Notably, Valeo stated its 
intention of attaining 70% of its parts in China, prior to the 2004 changes in trade policy. 20 
 
China’s aggregate automotive exports reveal a wide gap between the evolution of China’s 
automotive parts exports as compared with China’s export of assembled vehicles.  Thus, it 
appears that China’s capabilities in the automotive sector have improved during the 2000’s. 
 
  Since Chinese export data report firm ownership we can examine how China’s growth in 
auto parts export was apportioned between foreign-invested firms, versus local firms, as this 
decomposition allows us to speculate about two potential post-policy effects.   First, if joint 
venture firms preferred to purchase parts from their original suppliers, they would have been able 
to meet the content policy if they convinced their suppliers to relocate to China.  If supplier firms 
entered China, one would expect to see an expansion in the exports of car parts by foreign 
affiliated firms that had reconfigured their global supply chains.  Under this scenario, we would 
expect to see an expansion of exports by foreign-invested firms, or foreign-affiliated JV firms.  
Alternatively, Sino-foreign joint venture firms may have increased the Chinese-content of their 
production, by cultivating sourcing arrangements with local Chinese suppliers.  Due to the 
expansion of the local industry, this would have fostered the ability of firms to change their 
sourcing in the longer-run when private Chinese suppliers were available.  Indeed, between 2005 
and 2009 the number of private enterprises in the transportation equipment sector more than 
doubled, while the number of foreign enterprises rose by 75%.  Under this alternative, we expect 
to see expanded growth of export by private Chinese suppliers. 
 
  Turning to a comparison of 2001 and 2009 export data as displayed in the following 
figures, shows that growth in China’s aggregate parts exports to the rest of the world was 
underpinned by the growth of private Chinese firms rather than growth by foreign invested 
enterprises and state-owned enterprises.  Nonetheless, to further evaluate the role of growth in 
private domestic firms, it is useful to look at parts exports to the U.S. and Japan – countries that 
have large assembly operations of their own, who might have relocated part of their 




















  While the role of private Chinese firms is less strong in explaining the increase of 
automotive parts exports to Japan, than is the case for the U.S. the increased engagement of 
private firms is noticeable in both markets.  Second, while foreign-invested firms are responsible 
for a small share of the expansion in the U.S. market, the expansion by foreign-invested firms is 
dwarfed by the expansion by private firms. One message from the export data is that the scale 
and composition of China’s auto part production capacity has changed during the 2000’s.  The 
Chinese auto industry of 2001 is not the Chinese auto industry of 2009.  For this reason, much 
caution is required when interpreting developments in parts imports during China’s tariff policy 22 
 
years.  While export data do not prove that the content-based tariff policy improved the 
capabilities of local Chinese firms, the growth in exports is consistent with that conjecture. 
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6.0  Conclusion  
  
  This paper uses 1997-2009 Chinese product trade data to analyze the effects of the 
China’s content-based tariff policy on China’s auto part imports.  While economic models 
predict that China’s changes in automotive tariff policy would have reduced the foreign sourcing 
of automotive parts by foreign-affiliated auto assemblers in China, econometric evidence on this 
topic is mixed.  In particular, as predicted by a model of content areas, the data reveal that the 
dutiable value of automotive imports fell for foreign-affiliated firms.  In the case of ongoing 
transactions,  it appears that affected firms reduced their  reported prices reduced dutiable values.  
In contrast, in the case of  import quantities,  there were no noticeable changes in import volumes 
in the case of ongoing trade relationships.  However, at the extensive margin, it appears that 
firms responded to China’s content policy, as foreign-affiliated firms were more likely to end 
import connections, and were less likely to enter into new import relationships.   
 
  One possibility is that intensive margin quantity decisions are muted in this study, 
because firms respond to sourcing incentives with a long lag.  A lag of this sort is especially 
plausible in auto part sourcing which is viewed as requiring time consuming relationship-specific 
investments.  Following sourcing choices, auto assemblers may be reluctant to change suppliers 
prior to model redesign.  Nonetheless, industry participants speculate that the mid-2000’s trade 
policies may have had enduring effects, as firms sought to source inputs inside China rather than 
from without.
18   Due to relocation by ongoing suppliers, and identification of Chinese-based 
suppliers, firms may have changed their supply chain, and thus, will not revert to previous 
sourcing patterns, even after the removal of the contested tariff policies.   
 
                                                 
18 For example, see Keith Bradsher “Despite Trade Rulings, Beijing gains from Delay Tactics,” August 31, 2009 




Table 1:  The Firm Composition of China’s Auto Parts Imports 
 



















1997 27,141  2.36 0.356 0.143 0.519 
1998 26.059  2.57 0.336 0.166 0.487 
1999 36,267  3.74 0.383 0.166 0.432 
2000 42,014  5.17 0.311 0.175 0.500 
2001 49,658  6.19 0.298 0.191 0.496 
2002 60,009  7.86 0.287 0.218 0.464 
2003 70,011  13.0 0.264 0.181 0.499 
2004 80,697  16.0 0.230 0.224 0.479 
2005 86,272  15.6 0.220 0.273 0.434 
2006 97,641  19.5 0.176 0.276 0.470 
2007 102,451  21.7 0.162 0.291 0.473 
2008 111,289  23.7 0.177 0.301 0.447 
2009 108,353  24.0 0.194 0.310 0.426 
Note: Numbers include all HS2 imports in Chapter 87, as well as imports of auto 





Table 2: The Composition of China’s Transportation 
Sector Imports. 











Foreign  JV 
1997 13,460  5,750 10,773
1998 12,933  6,168 10,122
1999 18,175  8,046 12,514
2000 20,771  10,184 14,347
2001 23,736  12,410 16,197
2002 26,945  16,600 18,089
2003 27,205  21,010 20,516
2004 25,402  26,245 21,961
2005 23,304  30,718 22,009
2006 22,419  37,025 23,273
2007 21,395  43,984 23,829
2008 20,610  50,085 25,281
2009 18,208  50,862 23,443
Note: Numbers include all HS2 imports in Chapter 87, as well as imports of auto 
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  1997-2009 2001-2009 1997-2009 2001-2009 1997-2009 2001-2009 
Policy  Variable          
Joint Venture* 













      
Firm  Group  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No 
Firm  Group  Time  Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Panel Variable  
(rho) 










HS8 Product-  
Firm 
(.9998) 




2  .2065 .1061 .0773 .0773 .0000 .0004 
Observations 6,607  4,913  85,774  71,120  193,467  155,033 










(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) 
Policy  Variable  [2004] [2005] [2004] [2005] 









Foreign*[Policy in Effect] 




        
Firm Type         









(0.0336)        
-0.3154*** 
(0.0337)        
-0.2148*** 
(0.0421)        
-0.2367*** 
(0.0398)        
Private -0.2021*** 
(0.0344)        
-0.2006*** 
(0.0344)        
-0.2074*** 
(0.0343)        
-0.2048*** 
(0.0344)        
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 









2 .0232  .0223  .0237  .0278 
Observations 6,909  6,909 6,909  6,909 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  Dependent variable: 










(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) 
Policy  Variable  [2004] [2005] [2004] [2005] 
JV*[Policy in Effect]
-0.1331***       
(0.0256)        
-0.1474*** 
(0.0194)        
-0.1342***       
(0.0269)        
-0.1473*** 
(0.0271)        
Foreign*[Policy in 
Effect]
  -0.0039 
(0.0297) 
-0.0125 
(0.0290)    
HS6 Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firmgroup  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 









2 .667 .667 .667 .667 
Observations 73,519 73,519 73,519 73,519 
 
 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) 
Policy  Variable  [2004] [2005] [2004] [2005] 
JV*[Policy in Effect]
-0.1282***       
(0.0268)        
-0.1422*** 
(0.0272)        
-0.1389***       
(0.0282)        
-0.1492*** 
(0.0285)        
Foreign*[Policy in 
Effect]
  -0.0396 
(0.0318) 
-0.0247 
(0.0310)    
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HS6 Product FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firmgroup  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 









2 .135 .135 .135 .135 
Observations 73,518 73,518 73,518 73,518 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  Dependent variable: 




Table 6: Post Policy Changes in Import Prices by Firm-HS8  
 
Dependent Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) 
Policy  Variable  [2004] [2005] [2004] [2005] 
JV*[Policy in Effect]
-0.2023***       
(0.0239)        
-0.1671***       
(0.0242)        
-0.2266***       
(0.0249)        
-0.1850***       
(0.0253)        
Foreign*[Policy in 
Effect]




HS6 Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firmgroup  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 









2 .4255 .4260 .4243 .4260 
Observations 135,811 135,811 135,811 135,811 









(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pr(Exit) Pr(Exit) Pr(Exit) Pr(Exit) 












      
Firm Type         









(0.0683)        
-0.2020*** 






(0.0617)        
-0.2772*** 





Province  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HS6 Product FE  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Log  Likelihood  -1912 -2957 -2334 -1999 
Observations  7,304 7,304 7,182 7,007 











(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pr(Entry) Pr(Entry) Pr(Entry) Pr(Entry) 
  2004-05 2004-06 2003-05 2003-06 
Firm Type         









(0.0549)        
0.5186*** 






(0.0484)        
0.4009*** 





      
Province  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HS6 Product FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Log  Likelihood  -1912 -2957 -2334 -1999 
Observations  7,385 7,854 7,361 7,818 





HS6 Products and Product Name: 
401110  car tires; 410711  leather upholstery; 570292  auto carpet;  700711  auto toughened 
glass;700721  auto safety glass; 700910  auto mirror; 840732  small engine; 840733  medium 
engine; 840734  large engine; 840820  diesel engine; 840991  auto engine parts; 840999 
carburetor; 842131  auto air filter; 842139  catalytic converter; 848310  "camshaft, crankshaft"; 
848320  bearings; 848340  torque converters; 848350  "flywheels, pulleys"; 848410  gaskets; 
850110  gauges; 851110  spark plugs; 851120  magnetos; 851130  engine coils; 851140  engine 
starters; 851190  points; 851240 wipers, defrosters"; 851290  head and tail lamps; 852729  auto 
radios; 854110  auto bulbs; 854430  ignition wiring; 870810  bumpers; 870821  seat belts; 
870829  other body parts; 870831  brake linings; 870839  other brake parts; 870840  gear boxes;  
870850  drive axels; 870860  non-driving axles; 870870  road wheels and parts; 870880  
suspension systems; 870891  radiators and parts; 870892  mufflers and exhaust parts; 870893  
clutches and parts; 870894  "steering wheels, steering columns, steering boxes"; 870899  "other 
including engine sensors, u joints"; 902910  speedo tach; 940120  auto seats and parts; 940190  
auto seats and parts; 870600  "Chassis fitted with engines, for the motor vehicles of headings 
8703"; 870010  "Bodies (including cabs), for the motor vehicles of headings 8703"; 870830  
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